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Sufficient campaign funding for the purchase of vital mass me-
dia advertising before an election will mean little if a potential can-
didate cannot obtain a place on the ballot. Viewing the electoral
process as a time continuum, the area of ballot access regulation is
particularly important because it represents an essential "starting
gate" for those who wish to participate in the political process as
candidates. Certain areas of political regulation, for example,
campaign finance regulation or regulation of the mass media, have
been the focus of significant federal legislative activity. In consider-
ing ballot regulation, however, the emphasis is primarily on state
and local law. Nevertheless, the federal courts, and especially the
Supreme Court, have actively provided constitutional oversight of
state laws restricting access to the ballot. Thus, in this area the judi-
ciary, rather than the Congress, has become a forum for the equality-
oriented reform that has characterized ballot regulation in the last
decade.
While ballot placement may serve as an entry point for a politi-
cal campaign, there are important and complex cause/effect relation-
ships between regulating ballot access and regulating other areas of
the elections process. For example, obtaining a ballot position in a
state or local election may affect entitlement as a "legally qualified
candidate" to equal opportunity under section 315 of the Federal
Communications Act.' In addition, certain mechanisms provided by
state law as means for achieving ballot access, such as petition or
filing fee requirements, can be quite costly. This emphasizes the im-
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1. 47 U.S.C. § 315 (1970).
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portant role of campaign financing, even before one technically may
be termed a candidate.
In national election campaigns, state ballot access restrictions
can pose a critical barrier to a viable candidacy for minor party or
independent candidates. In turn, the success or failure of such can-
didates to obtain a place on the ballot in key states may be very
important in determining the strategic allocation of campaign re-
sources by major party candidates. Because ballot access for minor
candidates may vitally affect the outcome of elections on a national
plane, the significance of state ballot regulation should not be under-
estimated.
For instance, during the 1948 presidential election campaign, it
was the strategy of Strom Thurmond's Dixiecrat Party to persuade
Southern Democrats to accept the Dixiecrat candidates as the official
nominees of the Democratic Party, forcing President Truman and
Vice-Presidential nominee Barkley to seek a different position on the
ballot. The Dixiecrats succeeded in Alabama (where Truman and
Barkley were not on the ballot at all), Louisiana, Mississippi, and
South Carolina. Elsewhere, the Dixiecrats ran under the "State's
Rights" designation. Truman lost the four southern states in which
the Dixiecrats had been listed officially as Democrats. If Thurmond
had obtained access to the ballot under the Democratic Party label
in a few other southern states such as Georgia, the election decision
might have been thrown into the House of Representatives because
of the closeness of the Electoral College vote between Truman and
Republican nominee Thomas Dewey. Under those circumstances,
Thurmond could have served as kingmaker.2
It has also been observed that another crucial factor in the 1948
presidential election was that third party candidate Henry Wallace
was not on the ballot in Illinois; if he had been, he could have at-
tracted enough support to wipe out Truman's small 33,612 vote plu-
rality. This, too, might have altered the electoral vote to the point of
sending the election to the House of Representatives, particularly if
Wallace had made a better showing in California.
3
Turning to a close election of more recent vintage, it is possible
that the campaign of Democratic presidential nominee Jimmy
Carter was significantly aided when the United States Supreme
Court rejected independent candidate Eugene McCarthy's request to
set aside an order of a New York state court, which kept McCarthy's
name off the presidential ballot in that state.4 Otherwise, McCarthy
2. I. Ross, THE LONELIEST CAMPAIGN, THE TRUMAN VICTORY OF 1948 230-31, 247
(1968) (hereinafter cited as I. Ross).
3. Id. at 258-59.
4. Contessa v. McCarthy, 387 N.Y.S.2d 916, rev'd. 389 N.Y.S.2d 312, 429 U.S. 908
(1976) (application for stay of judgment denied).
might have drained off the liberal vote, and thus tilted the state, its
massive electoral vote, and conceivably the election, away from
Carter.5
Given the enormous political impact ballot placement can have,
it would be useful to explore the origin of ballot access restrictions.
II. Background of Ballot Restrictions
Modem ballot restrictions trace their existence to agitation by
Wilsonian Progressives of the early 1900's in favor of the "short bal-
lot." In 1911, a Short Ballot Organization was formed, with Wood-
row Wilson, then president of Princeton, serving as its head.6 The
organization advocated the "Short-Ballot principle," which main-
tained,
First: That only those offices should be elective which are impor-
tant enough to attract (and deserve) public examination; and,
Second: That very few offices should be filled by election at one
time, so as to permit adequate and unconfused public examination
of the candidates.
7
These reformers believed that holding too many election contests at
one time resulted in voter confusion that precluded knowledgeable
exercise of the franchise. In their words,
When the ballot is long, i e., when there are many offices to
be filled simultaneously by popular Vote, the people ... will not
scrutinize every name, but will give their attention to a few con-
spicuous ones and vote for the others blindly.... [I]t is not the
inconvenience of voting which practically disenfranchises the bulk
of the citizens, but the inconvenience of voting intelligenty. 8
It was suggested that this problem could be alleviated and public
interest in elections increased by removing insignificant or purely
ministerial offices from the ballot. Greater use of nonpartisan ballots
was also advocated in order to reduce the influence of the old politi-
cal "trusts." This was viewed as promoting freer competition and as
alleviating the difficulties facing new parties;- which were otherwise
seen as "stifled at birth."9
The reform movement was successful. Certain states shifted
from primaries to nonpartisan balloting for small city and town elec-
tions,' O and the short ballot agitation did result "in a considerable
decrease in the proportion of public officials chosen at the polls." "
5. J. WITCOVER, MARATHON, THE PURSUrr OF THE PRESIDENCY 1972-1976 630 (1977)
(hereinafter cited as J. WrrcovER).
6. R_ CHILDS, THE SHORT-BALLOT PRINCIPLES 170 (1911) (hereinafter cited as R.
CHILDS).
7. Id. at vii.
8. Id. at 24-25 (emphasis in original).
9. Id. at 21-22, 26, 31-40, 43-50, 152-53.
10. Eg., 9 ALA. CODE tit. 11, § 46-3 (1975).
11. G. POMPER, ELECTIONS IN AMERICA 7 (1%8).
Interestingly, however, the original concept of the short ballot-
restricting the number of electoral offices appearing on the ballot-
was quietly translated into legislation to restrict the number of candi-
dates appearing on the ballot for each office, although this was not
advocated as part of the short ballot principle to any great degree.
And, unfortunately, there has been little reasoned development of
philosophy behind the restricted state ballot, either regarding limita-
tion on the number of offices or candidates, beyond this early re-
formist activity. Subsequent case law evaluating ballot restrictions
often seems to repeat circa- 1910 catchwords of avoiding voter confu-
sion or preserving electoral integrity, without any real analysis of the
current validity of these concepts.
The development of regulation of candidate access to the ballot
differs from regulatory reform in some other electoral areas where
reform has proceeded in a more unified direction. With ballot access
regulation, however, actually there have been two distinct eras of
reform, which militated for change in opposing directions. As the
Supreme Court aptly observed in Lubin v. Panish,"2 "[Wihile pro-
gressive thought in the first half of the century was concerned with
restricting the ballot to achieve voting rationality, recent decades
brought an enlarged demand for an expansion of political opportu-
nity.""3 To understand the justifications behind each of the opposing
trends in ballot regulation, one must turn first to interests supporting
regulation in the first era of reform-that of restricting the ballot.
III. Interests in A Restricted Ballot
A. Promoting the American Two-Party Political System
Alexander Bickel viewed the existence of our essentially two-
party political process as responsible for the system's unique stabil-
ity:
Now, the dominance of two major parties enables us to achieve a
politics of coalition and accommodation rather than of ideological
and charismatic fragmentation, governments that are moderate,
and a regime that is stable. Without forgetting that of all the mys-
teries of government the two-party system is perhaps the deepest,
one can safely assert that each major party exerts centripetal force;
that it ties to itself the ambitions and interests of men who com-
pete for power, discouraging individual forays and hence the
sharply defined ideological or emotional stance; that it makes, in-
deed, for a climate inhospitable to demagogues; and that it pro-
vides by its very continuous existence a measure of guidance to
the marginally interested voter, who is eminently capable of cast-
12. 415 U.S. 709, 713 (1974).
13. This two-phase configuration of electoral reform is not unique to the ballot access
area, but appears as well in the regulation of voter registration and that of political parties and
the nominations process.
ing his ballot by more irrelevant criteria. The system, in sum, does
not altogether take mind out of politics, but it does tend to ensure
that there are few irreconcilable losers, and that the winners can
govern, even though--or perhaps because-there are equally few
total victories.
14
Although recognizing the valuable role minor parties can play in the
political process, and that states cannot choke off all political action
that is not encompassed by the two major parties, Bickel asserted
that "the states are entitled to put some store by the two-party sys-
tem, and they ought to have the power to give it a certain edge."' 5
Ballot access restrictions may serve this purpose by eliminating po-
tentially fragmentary third party candidates from the ballot. The
concept of restricting the ballot to protect the stability of the two-
party system therefore fosters the preservation of a functional politi-
cal system.
It may be true that the two-party system is uniquely stabilizing.
While the system has never received constitutional status, neverthe-
less it has been able to achieve a strongly entrenched position. It
thus seems logical that if the system continues to promote stability, it
will maintain its predominance, without extreme state or federal
government support, simply because it works. Nor should one un-
critically accept legislation with the express purpose of promoting
the two-party system, when it was written and passed by possibly
self-interested legislators, primarily members of the two major ex-
isting parties. On the other hand, it is possible that reform that
serves to weaken the two party process may also weaken systemic
stability.
Justice Black, writing for the majority of the Supreme Court in
Williams v. Rbodes, 6 which invalidated Ohio ballot restrictions
against independent and minor parties, seemed especially mindful of
the problem of self-interested legislators in stating,
The State asserts that the following interests are served by the
restrictions it imposes. It claims that the State may validly pro-
mote a two-party system in order to encourage compromise and
political stability. The fact is, however, that the Ohio system does
not merely favor a "two-party system"; it favors two particular
parties--the Republicans and the Democrats-and in effect tends
to give them a complete monopoly. There is, of course, no reason
why two parties should retain a permanent monopoly on the right
to have people vote for or against them.'
The Court seems to recognize that the abstract two-party system pro-
tection argument can be translated into an illegitimate argument for
14. A. BICKEL, REFORM AND CONTINUITY 22 (1971) (footnotes omitted) (hereinafter
cited as A. BICKEL).
15. Id. at 85.
16. 393 U.S. 23 (1968).
17. Id. at 31-32.
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protection by a state of the two existing major parties.I8 Perhaps this
translation reveals the difficulty of separating the two-party system
in the abstract from the political reality of the Democratic and Re-
publican Parties.
Elsewhere, the Supreme Court appears hostile to the notion of
protecting the political status quo; in Jenness v. Fortson,9 the Court
approved Georgia ballot access regulation because it "in no way
freezes the status quo, but implicitly recognizes the potential fluidity
of American political life." Likewise, in his dissent in Lippett v. Ci-
pollone,2 ° Justice Douglas questioned the compelling nature of a
state interest in preserving the status quo and in preserving political
stability by creating impediments to changes in party allegiance by a
candidate.
It has even been suggested that legislation protecting the two-
party system, thereby promoting moderate or centrist political
thought, may actually constitute discrimination against groups and
individuals according to the content of their ideas. Candidates rep-
resenting extremist and unpopular ideas may be denied access to the
ballot, yet it is protection of such unpopular viewpoints that lies at
the heart of the first amendment concept of free expression.2 1 An
emphasis on the importance of the role that third parties may play in
the political process thus may conflict with regulation protecting the
two-party system.
Minor parties, through their representation of new and unpopu-
lar ideas, actually may foster systemic stability by providing a release
valve for the expression of views and pressures that would otherwise
go unheard. 2 If serious minor candidates representing such views
were denied an electoral forum because they were precluded from
placement on a ballot, then dissident pressure might explode in more
destructive, far less legitimate ways. This would certainly not pro-
mote systemic stability by any definition.
Ballot access regulation clearly poses the potential difficulties
inherent in seeking to preserve systemic stability through legislation.
Accommodation is required between the importance of preserving
the two-party system and the need to protect the valuable role played
by third parties, 23 and the issue may be posed best as one of drawing
a line so that only serious candidates are permitted on the ballot,
whether their affiliation is with a major or minor party. To foster the
18. The Supreme Court, 1968 Term, State Regulation o/Placement on Ballot, 83 H.,v. L.
REV. 86, 88 (1969) (hereinafter cited as Court Review).
19. 403 U.S. 431, 439 (1971).
20. 404 U.S. 1032, 1034 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
21. Court Review, supra note 18, at 88-89.
22. See also A. BICKEL, supra note 14, at 79-80, Court Review, supra note 18, at 89.
23. See A. BICKEL supra, note 14.
two-party system by discriminating against the first amendment
rights of serious minor or independent candidates would not be legit-
imate, regardless of the stabilizing effect on the two-party system.
B. Assuring a Majority Winner
Another interest concerned with preserving the stability of our
political system that has been mustered in support of ballot access
restrictions is closely related to protecting the two-party system. This
is an interest in precluding access to minor and independent candi-
dates in order to ensure that the election results in a majority winner.
Assuring that the electoral victor is a majority choice, without the
burden of a runoff, was termed a legitimate state interest by the
Supreme Court in Bullock v. Carter,24 and Justice Stewart, dissenting
in Williams v. Rhodes,25 also supported this concept:
Surely a State may justifiably assert an interest in seeing that its
presidential electors vote for the candidate best able to draw the
support of a majority of voters within the State. By preventing
parties that have not demonstrated timely and widespread support
from gaining places on its ballot, Ohio's provisions tend to guard
against the possibility that small-party candidates will draw
enough support to prevent either of the major contenders from
obtaining an absolute majority of votes-and against the conse-
quent possibility that election may be secured by candidates who
gain a plurality but who are vis-a-vis their principal opponents,
preferred by less than half of those voting. Surely the attainment
of these objectives is well within the scope of a State's authority
under our Constitution.
26
If one accepts as desirable the characterization of American
politics as pluralistic,27 a picture of coalition-building by various in-
terests as the key to elections, then nothing is inherently wrong with
a minority, through the coalitional process, serving as kingmaker
once in a while. Nor is an occasional plurality victory such a great
danger to systemic stability. On the national level, several American
Presidents have been elected by plurality, for example, Harry Tru-
man and Jimmy Carter. Their terms of office have not evidenced
significantly greater dissension than may normally occur within the
pull and haul of day-to-day politics or that has been evidenced dur-
ing the terms of some Presidents who won the office by a sizeable
majority.
It can be said that if a recently elected official lacks majority
support, the political system will be unstable and the official will not
be able to govern effectively based on popular consent. This implies,
however, that political affiliation and support remain static, some-
24. 405 U.S. 134, 145 (1972).
25. 393 U.S. 23 (1968).
26. Id. at 53-54 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
27. See R. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY (1956).
thing that simple observation of the American political scene indi-
cates is not true. For instance, Lyndon Johnson was elected
President by a landslide in 1964, yet, by 1968, the country and the
Democratic party evidenced sharp political division.
If an absence of an electoral majority occurred very frequently,
negative consequences for the stability of the political process might
be a very real danger. But, if political expression by minority or
independent candidates with recognized support, and the expressive
and associational rights of their supporters, were stifled because such
candidates were not permitted a place on the election ballot, equally
negative consequences could result. The danger of suppressing the
means effectively to air strongly dissident views of a significant mi-
nority is a danger that the first amendment was particularly designed
to address. Again, if legitimate access to the ballot is barred for can-
didates representing these minority interests, supporters may be
more likely to lose trust in the openness of the political system and to
turn to illegitimate means of expression that could undermine the
stability of the political process.
Thus, an inflexibly restrictive ballot for the purpose of ensuring
a majority winner may be capable of damaging, rather than promo-
ting, systemic preservation. In the area of regulating candidate ac-
cess to the mass media, it may be more important that the views of
minor candidates reach the public than that individual candidates
themselves receive specific air wave access.28 While this concept
would seem superficially to apply by analogy to ballot access regula-
tion as well, perhaps there are real differences. An election cam-
paign serves as a focal point around which those with a dissident
minority viewpoint can organize, and unless a candidate represent-
ing a serious minority can obtain a place on the ballot, the organiza-
tion for purposes of political expression is not likely to be effective.
It has been suggested that the importance of minor parties is prima-
rily to prod major parties to take cognizance of the issues raised by
minorities, and eventually to absorb these interests into the major
party coalition.29 But unless serious minority candidates are able to
attain the forum of the ballot, they may not gain the attention of
major parties. Thus, in order for significant minority viewpoints to
reach the public, serious minor candidates should reach the ballot.
Even if the absence of a majority winner of an election is a
threat to systemic stability, there are other ways to address the prob-
lem beside completely excluding minor candidates from the ballot;
one suggestion is the run-off election. Justice Harlan, concurring in
28. Cf., A. MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITs RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 25-
26 (1948). 1
29. See A. BICKEL, supra note 14, at 79-80; Illinois State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist
Workers Party, 47 99 S. Ct. 983,991 (1979).
Williams v. Rhodes,3" points out the possible use of this alternative
and others to those barring third parties from the ballot:
My Brother Stewart is, of course, quite right in pointing out that
the presence of third parties may on occasion result in the election
of the major candidate who is in reality less preferred by the ma-
jority of the voters. It seems clear to me, however, that many con-
stitutional electoral structures could be designed which would
accommodate this valid state interest, without depriving other po-
litical organizations of the right to participate effectively in the
political process. A runoff election may be mandated if no party
gains a majority, or the decision could be left to the State Legisla-
ture . . Alternatively, the voter could be given the right, at the
general election, to indicate both his first and his second choice for
the Presidency-if no candidate received a majority of the first-
choice votes, the second-choice votes could then be considered.
Finally, Electors could be chosen on a district-by-district rather
than an at-large basis, thereby apportioning the electoral vote in a
way more nearly approximating the popular vote.
31
It is true that all these suggestions have their own disadvantages; for
example, a run-off election might entail additional expense, and se-
lection by the legislature is counter-majoritarian.32 But the added
cost of a run-off does seem a better alternative when weighed against
possible systemic instability that could result from a complete prohi-
bition of ballot position to third parties, hence stifling the expression
of minority interests with a significant modicum of support.
The electoral choice resulting in plurality victory was made by
the voting public itself. If voters particularly feared a plurality out-
come as undesirable, they could have responded differently with
their vote, i.e., by not "wasting" their vote on a candidate unlikely to
win. To say that something is "wrong" with the outcome of popular
voting sounds paternalistic, and a like charge could be lodged
against a legislative structuring of ballot access rules to prevent vot-
ers from choosing among a broader range of candidate (and ideolog-
ical) choices solely because of a not-always-accurate assertion that a
majority winner makes the political system a more stable one.
There are real fears today that the two-party system is in danger
of degenerating, while one issue groupings gain in importance,33 and
conceivably, opening the ballot to serious minor candidates might
exacerabate such a situation. There is also validity to systemic sta-
bility interests in restricting access to the ballot by third party candi-
dates. But these concerns do not alone justify absolute restriction of
the ballot to the two major parties.
30. 393 U.S. 23 (1968).
31. Id. at 46 n.8 (Harlan, J., concurring).
32. See Court Review, supra note 18, at 90 n.17.
33. See generally discussion in A. Ranmey, The Political Parties. Reform and Decle. in
THE NEw AMERICAN POLITICAL SYSTEM 213 (A. King ed. 1978); cf., Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S.
347, 379, 385 (1976) (Powell, J., dissenting) (concern of J. Powell with invalidation of pa-
tronage practices, which were perceived as contributing to the strength of party).
C. Restricting the Ballot to Serious Candidates
A legitimate and important justification for some restricting of
access to the ballot is that of reserving ballot position for serious
candidates only. This interest is also related to the goal of ensuring a
functional political system. It works to ensure robust political debate
by concerned participants, rather than a campaign characterized by
informational static from fringe and frivolous candidates using can-
didacy as a publicity stunt, not as a forum for expression on issues
they sincerely believe important.
It is far easier to say, however, that the ballot should be reserved
for serious candidates than it is to define what seriousness means.
The term would seem to embody two concepts. First, there should
be some focus on the candidate's subjective intent. For example, al-
though Eugene McCarthy may not have believed that his 1976 presi-
dential candidacy had a major chance of victory, he seemed to
intend his candidacy to make a serious political point about deficien-
cies in the role of the two major parties in the electoral system.34
Second, a determination of seriousness should in some measure be
directed to the amount of public support for having a candidate on
the ballot as a focal point for the expression of particular viewpoints
on issues of concern to political minorities. For a place on the ballot,
a candidate should be serious from both these perspectives.
Obviously, a determination of seriousness becomes a problem of
line drawing at heart, and a particularly difficult one to quantify or
encapsulate in neat formulae. The important problem of line draw-
ing in the ballot access area will be discussed more fully subse-
quently. Nevertheless, it should be clear that this interest in ballot
restriction does not dictate particular numerical limits on those can-
didates appearing on the ballot; if a large number were able to sat-
isfy criteria of seriousness, then all of this group should be entitled to
ballot position.
D. Preventing Voter Confusion and Apathy
An interest that does compel a limitation on the number of can-
didates allowed to appear on the ballot is that in restricting access to
the ballot in order to avoid voter confusion and apathy. This notion
combines both the goal of systemic integrity, through the fostering of
intelligent and interested voting, and that of broadening participa-
tion. If a ballot with a shorter list of candidates running for office is
more likely to interest the electorate, then they are more likely to
34. See Comments of Eugene McCarthy in Regulation of Political Campaigns-How Suc-
cessful? 34-35, 37, Am. BNT. INST. F. (1977).
participate in the political process through the exercise of the
franchise.
This notion was originally voiced by the members of the early
twentieth century short-ballot movement. But, although there was
some advocacy of limitation on the number of candidates running
for each office through tests of legitimacy such as petition or mone-
tary requirements,35 this was not the major thrust of the short-ballot
proponents. Rather, the primary concern was that the presence of a
large number of unimportant offices on the ballot, such as coroner,
for example, for which voter interest and information was low,
would simply confuse voters and lead to unintelligent voting, evi-
denced either by straight voting of the party ticket or a complete lack
of participation.36
But, as previously noted, there has been a shift in more recent
case law and commentary 37 from an emphasis on a government in-
terest in reducing the number of elective offices to an interest in re-
stricting the number of candidates running for each office, because of
the fear that voters might be confused by a choice from among mul-
tiple names under one office. Thus, the Court stated in Lubin '. Pan-
ish38 that,
A procedure inviting or permitting every citizen to present himself
to the voters on the ballot without some means of measuring the
seriousness of the candidate's desire and motivation would make
rational voter choices more difficult because of the size of the bal-
lot and hence would tend to impede the electoral process ....
That "laundry list" ballots discourage voter participation and con-
fuse and frustrate those who do participate is too obvious to call
for extended discussion.
3 9
35. See R. CHILDS supra note 6, 157.
36. Id. at 31-42, 135-36.
Actually, interest in this issue is not merely historical. Herbert Alexander, a current com-
mentator on campaign finance regulation, views public financing plans as raising a problem
with the excessive number of elected offices in the United States:
As the states enact forms of public financing, the large number of elected offi-
cials-a hallmark of this country's political system-will become all too obvious. In
the United States, over a four-year cycle, more than 500,000 public officials are
elected, and far more than that number campaign for nomination. Long ballots re-
quire candidates to spend money in the mere quest for visibility, and the long ballot
and frequent elections combined bring both voter fatigue and low turnout. As
financial pressures mount, states might give increasing consideration to reducing the
number of elective offices, thus diminishing the amounts of money (public or private)
needed to sustain the electoral system.
H. ALEXANDER, CAMPAIGN MONEY, REFORM AND REALITY IN THE STATES 9 (1976). This
also points up the close interrelationships between different areas of electoral regulation. Ob-
viously, the number of offices, or the number of candidates, that appear on a ballot will have a
direct bearing on the total amount of public campaign funding that a state or the federal
government must provide, and to whom this money will be given.
37. Note, Adams . Askew: The Right to Vote and the Right To Be A Candidate-Analo-
gour or Incongruous Rights?, 33 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 243, 244 (1976) (hereinafter cited as
Note, Candidate Right).
38. 415 U.S. 709 (1974).
39. Id. at 715.
Elections occurring too frequently and requiring voter decisions
on too many offices at one time may indeed breed confusion or apa-
thy, especially if low level, non-policy making offices are on the bal-
lot, but this is not the same question as whether four or six
candidates in place of two would be too "confusing." There has
been insufficient reasoned analysis of the latter question. The
Court's observation, that the fact that the long ballot discourages
participation is too obvious for discussion, may be open to dispute.
With today's higher literacy rates and rapid, modem mass communi-
cation, it seems doubtful that several names under an office instead
of two will be so confusing as to paralyze the average voter. The fear
of confusion appears somewhat overstated, and those who voice the
concept sound paternalistic in their estimation of the intelligence of
the voting public. Of course, the question is essentially a matter of
degree, and there is an outer limit at which voter confusion and apa-
thy become a reality. But, in light of weighty countervailing interests
of minority political expression through attainment of the ballot,
care must be taken that the limits are not drawn too restrictively.'
Voter apathy is manifested primarily by low voter turnout, al-
though there may be some vote drop-off as one proceeds down the
ballot from major offices to less publicized ones (a too-many-offices
problem). But one commentator, studying the effect of the position a
candidate occupies on the ballot, concluded that after taking time to
participate in an election, voters are loathe to leave any contests un-
marked for fear of "wasting" a vote.41 Common sense would seem
to dictate that once a voter expends the energy to go to the polls to
vote at all for a particular office, he or she is not likely to be deterred
from voting simply because several candidates are running for that
office instead of two. And, although extreme cases are always possi-
ble, the "horrible" hypothesized in Lubin v. Panish42 of a dozen or
more aspirants running for a single office seems unlikely to occur
with great frequency.
In fact, voter apathy appears to be a widespread phenomenon
today even where there are only two or three candidates in the run-
ning for very prominent offices. In the 1976 presidential election, for
example, the turnout of 54.4 percent was the poorest in 28 years.43
This suggests that electorate apathy is a result of many complex fac-
tors not particularly related to the number of candidates appearing
40. Cf. Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 47 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring). Voter confu-
sion, however, might be a real problem in multimember districts, where ballots have contained
over 20 candidates. See Chapman v. Meier, 420 U.S. 1 (1975); Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S.
124 (1971); Lucas v. General Assembly of Colo., 377 U.S. 713, 731 (1964).
41. Note, Caiffornia Ballot Position Statuter" An Unconstitutional Advantage to Incum-
bents, 45 S. CAL. L. Rv. 365, 374 n.18 (1972) (hereinafter cited as Note, Ballot Position).
42. 415 U.S. 709, 716 (1974).
43. J. WrrcovER, supra note 5, at 643-44.
on the ballot for each office. Nevertheless, if voter confusion is in
fact a problem, voter education, in the form of informational pam-
phlets on candidates, for example," would be a better answer than
eliminating serious candidates on a purely numerical basis. In addi-
tion, such educational attempts might enhance political debate.
It has been argued that if a voter cannot comprehend the ballot
and votes improperly, resulting in the invalidation of his vote, he has
been disenfranchised. By analogy, if the presence of too many can-
didates for an office on a ballot deterred voting, the same argument
could be made. But disenfranchisement can also occur if a candi-
date with significant support is barred from the ballot simply be-
cause too many candidates would be "confusing", and his supporters
cannot vote for him. Even assuming an arbitrarily short ballot fos-
ters voter interest and participation, the first amendment rights of the
serious candidate, and the additional associational and expressive
rights of his supporters, would be impaired. These parties would be
denied effective participation through the exercise of their vote and
in campaign activity, and some might be alienated from the political
system. Thus, the participatory interest appears to cut both ways.
The Court observed in Lubin v. Panish4 5 that "[r]ational results
within the framework of our system are not likely to be reached if
the ballot for a single office must list a dozen or more aspirants who
are relatively unknown or have no prospect of success."'  Yet Jus-
tice Harlan, concurring in Williams v. Rhodes,47 stated that "the
presence of eight candidacies cannot be said, in light of experience,
to carry a significant danger of voter confusion."48 If one is prima-
rily concerned with limiting ballot access to a magic number that
will not confuse voters (a difficult determination more appropriate to
social scientists), then the judicial statements above offer the dubious
guideline that the correct outer limit is somewhere between eight and
twelve candidates for office. The mere posing of a guideline in this
fashion indicates that the answer to ballot regulation does not lie in
numerical absolutes. Rather, the key lies in a test of candidate seri-
ousness, which would serve to maintain elections as legitimate fo-
rums for political debate, and as a by-product, might keep the
number of candidates in a reasonable range in most cases without
arbitrary numerical limits.
E Interests in Administrative Feasibility
The discussion of the number of candidates to appear on a bal-
44. See C. MERRIAM, H. GOSNELL, NON-VoTiNG 237-38 (1924).
45. 415 U.S. 709 (1974).
46. Id. at 716.
47. 393 U.S. 23 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring).
48. Id. at 47.
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lot implicates questions of administrative feasibility, an issue often
raised in other contexts of election regulation.49 For example, the
number of candidates that are permitted a position on the ballot will
affect the costs of ballot preparation, dissemination, and counting.
One particular problem of administration has been suggested in re-
cent years as justifying ballot restrictiveness; namely, the difficulty
that a state faces when there are more candidates for an office than a
voting machine has handles.50 That voting machines are not univer-
sally used in elections in many states may diminish the importance
of this concern for the present, but the problem situation has arisen.
Several federal courts have addressed the issue, to reach con-
fficting resolutions. In Hudler v. Austin5 a three-judge federal court
in Michigan upheld special state legislation that strengthened re-
quirements necessary for ballot entitlement in order to reduce the
overall number of candidates, in part because the preexisting peti-
tioning regulation would have resulted in too many candidates for
voting machines.52 A federal district court in Delaware, however,
ordered the use of paper ballots when the number of potential candi-
dates exceeded the capacity of voting machines."
If the number of candidates for an office exceeds machine ca-
pacity, but all the candidates meet a reasonable test of seriousness,
then all belong on the ballot, regardless of the administrative diffi-
culty. In the great majority of cases, a requirement of seriousness
will be sufficient in itself to avoid this mechanical problem. When it
does not, barring serious candidates from the ballot simply because
of a technological limitation of voting machinery seems more irra-
tional than arbitrarily limiting candidates on the ballot to a particu-
lar number to avoid voter "confusion."
Forcing state election systems to turn to paper ballots in place of
voting machines may be extremely burdensome and costly. But pa-
per ballots are an existing alternative that should be utilized rather
than eliminating a serious candidate. If the United States can put a
man on the moon, it should be possible to circumvent technological
problems arising on the rare occasions when there are more serious
candidacies than voting machines can handle.
Nevertheless, these administrative problems are very real.
49. For example, campaign finance reporting and disclosure requirements may raise is-
sues of feasibility of compliance and enforcement.
50. See Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 145 (1972); Note, Candidate Right, supra note 37,
at 244 n.9.
51. 419 F. Supp. 1002 (E.D. Mich. 1976) (3 Judge Ct.).
52. The effective date of the legislation came so close to the upcoming primary, however,
that the court held the act inapplicable to the general election of that year, forcing defendants
to take necessary steps to place all parties on the ballot who would have been eligible under the
prior regulation. Id. at 1013-14.
53. Mclnerney v. Wrightson, 421 F. Supp. 726 (D. Del. 1976); cf. McCarthy v. Tribbett,
421 F. Supp. 1193 (D. Del. 1976).
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When all potential candidates are not serious, administrative costs
become a sounder reason for eliminating the more frivolous candi-
dates from the ballot, so that the entire electoral process is not ham-
pered in the interest of a few fringe candidates. For serious
candidates, some sacrifice of administrative efficiency and money
seems more justifiable, although the problem is a difficult one. Since
the experience of many states shows that no more than handful of
parties tries to qualify even where petition signature requirements
are as low as one percent,54 it would seem the occasions for sacrifice
will be few.
It has already been suggested that the relative expansiveness or
restrictiveness of ballot access regulation may affect the amount of
public subsidy that may be expended by federal or state govern-
meits on election campaigns. An administrative interest in protect-
ing the public treasury could be asserted in support of restrictive
ballot regulation, and the same could be said about plans to provide
candidates with a public subsidy in the nature of electronic media
time. Although the Federal Communications Commission defines
"candidate" for purposes of eligibility for equal broadcast opportu-
nity more inclusively than ballot position alone, so that an an-
nounced candidate qualified to hold office and permitted write-in
status could receive equal opportunity," the liberality of ballot ac-
cess regulation still has great bearing on the number of individuals
entitled to media time under section 315(a) of the Communications
Act.56 These interrelationships between ballot access and other areas
of electoral regulation again illustrate that ballot access cannot be
regulated in a vacuum. That expansive ballot access may increase
administrative difficulty in the area of campaign funding or media
coverage does not justify excluding serious candidates from the bal-
lot. But these cross-effects do serve to reinforce the importance of
developing a mechanism for reasonable line drawing between the
serious and frivolous candidate.
IV. Interests in Allowing Ballot Access
Line drawing focuses on the need for some restriction on ballot
placement. But it has been noted that regulation in the area of ballot
access evidenced a change in direction in the last decade in the form
of judicially mandated broadening of access. Liberalization of ballot
access regulation can be justified as supporting several of the general
goals of electoral reform, just as the same can be said of ballot re-
strictive legislation.
54. Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 44 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring).
55. See 47 C.F.R. §§ 73.120, 73.290, 73.657 (1976).
56. 47 U.S.C. § 315 (197 ).
A. First Amendment Rights of Candidates and the Electorate
Recent Supreme Court case law in the ballot access area has
utilized a fourteenth amendment equal protection analysis5 7 to in-
validate ballot restrictions that impaired fundamental rights of vot-
ing or association. But, although the cases do not always emphasize
it, a first amendment right of candidates to free expression is a major
interest in support of unrestricted ballots. If a serious candidate is
denied a ballot position, he is denied an effective mechanism for the
expression of his political views. The Court has not recognized a
fundamental interest in being a candidate for election, although this
has been maintained on a lower federal court level.5" But if a politi-
cal candidate's expenditure of personal funds for campaigning is
protected under the first amendment as instrumental to his political
expression, 9 then surely the right of a serious, qualified candidate to
appear on the electoral ballot likewise should be encompassed by the
first amendment. Thus, a focus on the individual expressive interest
of the political candidate supports broad ballot access.
As noted in Buckley v. Valeo,6 ° ballot restrictions are not only a
direct burden on a candidate's ability to run, but also on the voter's
ability to voice preferences. An individualized emphasis on the first
amendment rights of voters and supporters of candidates serves to
justify liberal ballot access as well. Although the majority in Wil-
liams v. Rhodes6 relied on an equal protection analysis, concurring
Justices Douglas and Harlan recognized the basic first amendment
underpinning in this area in their invalidation of Ohio's ballot re-
strictions. Thus, Justice Douglas observed that "the First Amend-
ment, made applicable to the States by reason of the Fourteenth
Amendment, lies at the root of these cases,"62 and Justice Harlan
"would rest this decision entirely on the proposition that Ohio's stat-
utory scheme violates the basic right of political association assured
by the First Amendment ....
Being able to vote for the candidate of one's choice is the most
common means of political expression in our mass society, where
many are unable to contribute monetarily, or lack the time for vol-
unteer effort. Such a basic right deserves strong constitutional pro-
tection. Likewise, while freedom of association is not expressly
designated in the Constitution, it seems so fundamentally tied to ef-
57. E.g., Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968).
58. Duncantell v. Houston, 333 F. Supp. 973 (S.D. Tex. 1971). See discussion in Court
Review, supra note 18, at 77-78 n.80.
59. See generally Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
60. Id. at 94.
61. 393 U.S. 23 (1968).
62. Id. at 38 (Douglas, J., concurring).
63. Id. at 41 (Harlan, J., concurring).
fective political expression in society that it too must come within
first amendment protection. The associational interest poses an issue
of effectiveness-if a candidate is barred from the ballot or can only
be given write-in status, his supporters are prevented from associat-
ing effectively for the purpose of meaningful political expression.
As mentioned, some cases have tended to emphasize the in-
dividualized first amendment interest of the citizen in associating,
but to phrase it within the rubric of a fourteenth amendment equal
protection "fundamental interest" standard.' 4 This necessitated a
finding of a fundamental interest at stake, here an interest in free
association or the right to vote freely. But this analysis presents
problems. It seems peculiar to speak of equal protection of a funda-
mental interest (freedom of association by candidate supporters) that
is already constitutionally protected under the first amendment itself.
It would be far less convoluted to rely on the first amendment di-
rectly. Also, if the Supreme Court may retreat from a recognition of
fundamental interests,6" this eventually could weaken the value of
ballot access cases relying on this approach and force ballot access
proponents to take a different tack. Thus, the interest of the citizen
in effective association with a candidate able to achieve ballot access
may be better and more straightforwardly approached as a first
amendment interest. 66
Finally, collective, societal first amendment interests are impli-
cated as well in the restriction of a candidate's access to the ballot.
From the Meildejohnian standpoint67 of promoting political debate
so that the public can be informed in its self-governing, when a seri-
ous candidate cannot appear on the ballot and thereby gain public
attention to his views, robust debate may be inhibited.
B. Promoting Equality of Treatment Among Candidates
Equality notions have been the motivating force behind several
recent electoral reforms. An interest in equalizing, constitutionalized
under the fourteenth amendment, has figured prominently as well in
64. See, e.g., Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968).
65. See San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). But
see Illinois State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 99 S. Ct. 983, 991 (1979).
66. See Court Review, supra note 18, at 91-95. The focus of the Court's analysis in Wil-
liams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968), may be due in part to the fact that plaintiffs' pleadings
characterized the case as involving equal protection. Id. at 42 n. 1 (1968) (Harlan, J., concur-
ring).
It is interesting that in William the Supreme Court was willing to accept the argument
that political association cannot be unduly burdened by too restrictive a regulation of candi-
date access to the ballot, yet the Court later refused to find that limiting the amount of an
individual's campaign contributions unconstitutionally restricted political association. Buck-
ley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). While in the latter situation the individual can still associate
by contributing, although restricted in amount, both situations involve direct political expres-
sion by a candidate,with whom supporters associate by contributing or voting.
67. A. MEiKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT(1948).
recent judicial invalidation of ballot regulation on grounds of unfair
treatment of certain candidates and their supporters. Legislated in-
equities addressed by courts include those between wealthy and
poorer candidates,6" and between major party candidates and minor
party or independent candidates.
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Courts generally have not taken a possible approach under the
fourteenth amendment of finding invidious discrimination against a
suspect class of unpopular political minorities7° or the poor. Rather,
as mentioned, equal protection analysis has proceeded under the ru-
bric of the fundamental interest; there must be equal treatment by
the state when fundamental interests such as the right to vote or to
associate freely are involved. It was suggested that the interests are
essentially of a first amendment nature, but perhaps in this area
equality and expressive interests actually are closely intertwined.
Kenneth Karst seems to acknowledge this interrelationship in posit-
ing his first amendment principle of equal liberty of expression.71
Judicial equalizing on the basis of wealth has been particularly
apparent in cases concerning the validity of state filing fee require-
ments as a prerequisite for a candidate's placement on the ballot.
The Supreme Court struck down two such state schemes, in part be-
cause they unfairly favored the wealthy, in Bullock v. Carter72 and
Lubin v. Panish." It is curious that wealth equalization was judi-
cially mandated in the ballot access area when legislation en-
couraged the contrary, yet the Court refused to countenance wealth
equalizing in the area of campaign finance regulation, where legisla-
tion attempted to reduce the importance of wealth differentials be-
tween candidates. The difference in treatment seems justifiable in
light of the fact that in the ballot access area, first amendment and
equality interests are allied behind the movement to broaden ballot
access, while in the area of campaign finance regulation, equalizing
on the basis of wealth may in fact impair first amendment interests
in free expression by candidates.74
Cases involving state petitioning requirements as a means for
minor or independent candidates to achieve ballot access have raised
another issue of inequity-that in the treatment between major party
and other candidates. The Court has been willing to some extent to
enforce greater equality of treatment in this area, but it has found
some difference in treatment to be sustainable. This parallels the
68. E.g., Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709 (1974); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972).
69. Eg., Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968).
70. See Court Review, supra note 18, at 86.
71. Karst, Equality as a Central Princile in the First Amendment, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 20,
59 (1975).
72. 405 U.S. 134 (1972).
73. 415 U.S. 709 (1974).
74. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 43 (1976).
Court's response in Buckley v. Valeo" that some difference in the
public funding of major party and minox candidates was justified as
well.76
The cumulative effect of ballot restrictive legislation in fifty
states that vary widely as to requirements on evidence of public sup-
port for a candidate by signature,77 filing fees, filing deadlines, etc.,
may make a national candidacy for a minor or independent candi-
date virtually impossible-a clear inequity imposed on these candi-
dates. Thus, in 1976, independent presidential candidate Eugene
McCarthy was forced to resort to lengthy and expensive judicial pro-
ceedings in many federal and state courts, in order to obtain a ballot
position as an independent candidate. Several of the states denied
ballot access to independents entirely.78
It has been observed that the presidential primary process of
major political parties is also arduous and costly,79 but candidates of
the two major parties are undeniably in a better position to obtain
ballot access than are independents, although primaries may be sig-
nificant barriers for individual major party candidates. The promul-
gation of uniform state law requirements on ballot access, if widely
enacted by states, might help to resolve this inequity; federal inter-
vention in this area, however, might involve an unconstitutional in-
cursion into the power of the states to regulate elections.
Broadening participation is an aim of electoral reform closely
related to that of equality. If serious candidates are allowed on the
ballot, presumably supporters of these candidates will be more in-
clined to participate in campaign activity, or at least in voting. On
the other hand, it has been suggested that the appearance of too
many candidates on the ballot may result in voter confusion, apathy,
and lack of participation." This presents an interesting impasse,
whereby the interest in broadened public participation in politics can
be asserted both in favor of expansive ballot access and against it. It
seems likely that participation might be deterred at either regulatory
75. See generaly id.
76. Ballot access decisions seem to shift from a test of strict scrutiny-compelling state
interest standard of equal protection review, wherein a state must use the least drastic alterna-
tive to achieve its ends, to more lenient review under a rational means test. Buckley v. Valeo,
424 U.S. 1, 92-94 (1976), is a recent suggestion of the propriety of strict scrutiny. Placement of
the burden of proof is inconsistent from case to case, and reliance often shifts between first
amendment analysis and the more often used equal protection-fundamental interest approach.
This makes predicting future judicial trends difficult, because the standards chosen can affect
the conclusion reached.
77. See Note, Candidate Right, supra note 37, at 243 n.3.
78. See, e.g., McCarthy v. Briscoe, 429 U.S. 1316 (1976); McCarthy v. Kirkpatrick, 420 F.
Supp. 366 (W.D. Mo. 1976); McCarthy v. Noel, 420 F. Supp. 799 (D.R.I. 1976); McCarthy v.
Askew, 420 F. Supp. 775 (S.D. Fla. 1976); McCarthy v. Tribbett, 421 F. Supp. 1193 (D. Del.
1976). See also Armor & Marcus, The Bloodless Revolution of 1976 63 A.B.A.J. 1108 (1977).
79. J. WITCOVER, supra note 5.
80. See Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709, 715 (1974); Note, Candidate Right, supra, note 37,
at 244.
extreme. Thus, the situation suggests that the answer to ballot regu-
lation lies in reasonable line drawing, not in any absolutes.8'
C. Preventing the Operation of Incumbent Seff-Interest
It has already been observed that because ballot regulations will
be enacted primarily by incumbent office holders of the two major
parties, the danger that the preeminence of the two-party system will
be threatened by such legislation is small. This is really another way
of stating that there is a danger of self-interested action by incum-
bent legislators in the ballot regulation area, as in other areas of po-
litical regulation. Major party incumbents may structure the rules
governing access to the ballot to protect their own position, to the
disadvantage of minor party and independent candidates. 82  Evi-
dence of the operation of this problem is available.
In the 1948 presidential election, third party candidates played a
particularly significant role, and this seems to have been an impetus
behind the passage of ballot restrictive legislation by major party in-
cumbents. For example, the very restrictive Ohio legislative scheme
at issue in Williams v. Rhodes,83 which made ballot access extremely
difficult for independent and minor candidates, was passed between
1948 and 1952, after Electors pledged to third party candidate Henry
Wallace had received 30,000 votes out of the 3,000,000 cast in 1948.
Since President Truman carried Ohio by only 7,000 votes, the Wal-
lace vote might well have been decisive if it had increased margin-
ally.84 It seems possible that some major party legislators pulled
together to pass legislation that would prevent a recurrence of signif-
icant third party influence made possible by a place on the ballot.
In the recent case of Hudler v. Austin85 a Michigan law, which
stiffened requirements for ballot position, was passed with an up-
coming election in mind; it appeared that there might be too many
candidates to allow the use of voting machines under the old ballot
access standards. If such special legislation is permitted, it might be
possible as well for incumbents to enact stricter requirements aimed
81. As an aside, it is obvious that the area of ballot access regulation has been one of
considerable judicial activity from the late 1960's onward. Alexander Bickel has stated, "A
decade ago, any suit to gain a place on the ballot for a minor party or an independent candi-
date might have failed at the outset for jurisdictional reasons. Federal courts were loath to
exercise supervision over the electoral process .. " A. BICKEL, supra note 14, at 81. He
believed that this jurisdictional barrier was effectively overcome when the Court addressed
legislative apportionment in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). If so, this serves again to
reveal that no area of electoral regulation can be considered without accounting for develop-
ments in other regulatory areas as well.
82. See American Party of Texas v. White, 415 U.S. 767, 773 n.4 (1974); Court Review,
supra note 18, at 92.
83. 393 U.S. 23 (1968).
84. Id. at 47 n.9 (Harlan, J., concurring).
85. 419 F. Supp. 1002, 1017-18 (E.D. Mich. 1976) (3 judge court).
at barring certain minor candidates from the ballot in a particular
election, an extremely worrisome proposition. In American Party of
Texas v. White86 the Supreme Court struck down a state practice of
printing on absentee ballots only the names of the two major politi-
cal parties, even when a minor candidate qualified for ballot access.
Surely the most blatant example of the use of ballot regulation
by incumbents to entrench themselves further in a position of politi-
cal power is that provided by laws governing the order in which can-
didates for the same office appear on the ballot in certain states. The
most common state provision for determining order of candidate
names on the ballot is rotation of names, whereby a candidate's
name occupies different positions on different ballots, and each can-
didate appears in a particular position approximately the same
number of times as any other candidate.87 Other methods used are
alphabetical order (although it has been asserted that some political
parties choose candidates with surnames entitling them to an earlier
listing on the ballot);88 party columns; how a political party fared in
the preceding election; and lottery. Yet, in Massachusetts and Cali-
fornia, for example, first ballot position was reserved for the incum-
bent candidate running for re-election, and the incumbents were
designated as such on the ballot itself.89
There is data based on statistical analysis demonstrating that
the candidate whose name appears first in the list of candidates for a
particular office on a ballot is the beneficiary of a substantial posi-
tional bias in his or her favor, which can affect election results.9"
This is termed a windfall or "donkey" vote.9 Thus, state laws al-
lowing incumbents first ballot position are strong evidence of self-
interest on the part of incumbent legislators passing measures
designed to safeguard their positions. Along these lines, one com-
mentator noted, "It is likely that California's apparently arbitrary
decision to eliminate the positional bias except where an incumbent
seeks re-election is attributable to the desire of lawmakers to en-
hance their chances of re-election.
'92
As a sidelight of the study of positional bias, it was found that
the impact of positional preference increases as the election becomes
further removed from center stage.93 This finding lends some sup-
86. 415 U.S. 767, 794 (1974).
87. Note, Ballot Position, supra note 41, at 379 n.37. See 1975, Cal. Stats. ch 1211 for an
example of rotation provision.
88. Note, Ballot Position, supra note 41, at 366 n.2.
89. Id. at 379 n.37. See also CAL. ELECS. CODE § 10301 (Deering, 1961) (current version
at CAL. ELEC. CODE § 10211 (Deering 1977)).
90. Note, Ballot Position, supra note 41, at 365.
91. Id. at 375 n.19. See discussion in Clough v. Guzzi, 416 F. Supp. 1057 (D. Mass.
1976) (3 judge court).
92. Note, Ballot Position, supra note 41, at 380, 389-90.
93. Id. at 374.
port to the notion that too many offices to be voted upon at one
election may impair intelligent voting. On the other hand, no corre-
lation was found between the number of candidates and the intensity
of the positional bias favoring the first listed candidate,94 undercut-
ting the argument that too many candidates listed per office would
confuse the voter and decrease reasoned voting.
Courts have split when faced with equal protection challenges
to ballot position laws. An Arizona case, Kautenburger v. Jackson,9
mandated the use of rotation of names on voting machines in place
of an alphabetical order system, and in Gould v. Grubb,9 6 the Cali-
fornia provision for listing incumbents first and the remaining candi-
dates in alphabetical order was held unconstitutional by the
California Supreme Court. California's Political Reform Act of
1974 (Proposition 9) prohibited listing incumbents first, and required
the use of a randomized alphabet method to ensure every candidate
equal access to the best ballot position.97
Illustrating an interesting variation on the theme of self-inter-
ested legislative control over ballot position, a candidate endorsed by
the Democratic Party of Rhode Island in its primary was listed in the
first column of the ballot and marked with an asterisk,98 and county
clerks in Illinois at one time placed candidates of the political party
to which they belonged at the top of the ballot.99 In Clough v.
Guzi,100 however, a three judge federal court upheld the Massachu-
setts statute allowing the incumbent candidate to be listed first on the
ballot as well as being designated as the incumbent. The court ac-
cepted the highly questionable argument of the state that if there
existed an uninformed segment of voters, their votes should go to the
incumbent because at least he would have some experience.
The ballot designation of incumbency does provide information
to the voter, a first amendment interest of sorts, but it clearly offends
all notions of fairness, and is unjustified when evaluated in the con-
text of the considerable advantages in perquisites of office, name rec-
ognition, and greater media coverage already possessed by
94. Id. at 375 n.21.
95. 85 Ariz. 128, 333 P.2d 293 (1958), also described in Note, Ballot Position, supra note
41, at 379.
96. 14 Cal. 3d 661, 122 Cal. Rptr. 377, 536 P.2d 1337 (1973).
97. 1975 Cal. Stats., ch. 1211, referred to in Bolinger, Calfornia Election Law During the
Sixties and Seventies: Liberalization and Centralization (1977), in 28C CAL. ELEC. CODE 55
(West 1977).
98. See McKenna v. Reilly, 419 F. Supp. 1179, 1181 (D.R.I. 1976).
99. This practice was invalidated in Sangmeister v. Woodard, 565 F.2d 460 (7th Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 939 (1978). The Court, however, vacated a district court order
that a rotational selection procedure be implemented, and remanded the case to the district
court to order defendants to devise a constitutionally permissible ballot placement procedure.
The opinion cites ballot position case law, and summarizes studies on the possibility of posi-
tional bias.
100. 416 F. Supp. 1057 (D. Mass. 1976) (3 judge court).
incumbents.'' Simply listing the incumbent first provides no infor-
mation, sacrifices equality, and is even more unjustified.
Thus, in light of potential positional bias, it is facially unfair
further to enhance the advantages of incumbency by designating the
incumbent as such on the ballot, or by listing the incumbent first,
when the obviously less drastic alternative of name rotation is avail-
able.10 2 Printing different ballot forms may be more costly, but this
is little to ask in the interest of avoiding the clear inequity that might
otherwise result from this blatant example of official self-interest.
The problem of legislative self-interest certainly cautions careful
scrutiny of ballot restrictive regulation. It may militate in favor of
erring on the side of greater openness of access, when considered in
the context of the advantages to the major parties and to incumbents
and the disadvantages to minor candidacies in other areas of electo-
ral regulation such as campaign finance or the mass media.
V. Resolution By Line Drawing
The above analysis indicates that the issue of ballot regulation is
not simply balck or white. There are legitimate interests in favor of
some ballot restrictiveness as well as in favor of a certain degree of
openness. The question, and, hence, the controversy, is where to
draw the line that inevitably must be drawn, in order to allow ballot
access to serious candidates, while excluding a flock of fringe or friv-
olous candidates that might otherwise make a mockery of the elec-
toral process.
Although "seriousness" embodies both a notion of objective
public support and subjective candidate intent, it is difficult to refine
the term further. Subjective determinations are always troublesome,
and what should be a proper standard of objective support? The
Court's response has as yet been inconsistent and vague. Jenness v.
Fortson 0 3 refers to the necessity of a candidate showing a significant
modicum of support in order to achieve ballot access. Yet in Ameri-
can Party of Texas v. White1° the Court speaks of significant com-
munity support, and in Storer v. Brown, 05 of substantial support in
the community. Surely "modicum" and "substantial" imply widely
divergent standards.
The prime interest of third party and independent candidates is
in the expression of their views, in most cases, not in winning the
101. But see Note, Ballot Position, supra note 41, at 391 n.77. On the utility for informed
voting of party labels on ballots, compare Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347, 385 (1976) (Powell, J.,
dissenting) with R. CHILD supra note 6 at 21-30, 36-42, 135-36, 152-53.
102. Id. at 377-78 n.31. Using a political party's success in a prior election as a ballot
placement determinant could conceivably have an effect of promoting continuity in how that
party fares from election to election.
103. 403 U.S. 431, 442 (1971).
104. 415 U.S. 767, 782 (1974).
105. 415 U.S. 724, 743 (1974).
election. The requirement of a measure of public support must be
cognizant of this distinction, yet case law at times seems to imply
that too high a standard is needed. For example, in Storer the Court
asserts as a consideration "the relationship between the showing of
support through a petition requirement and the percentage of the
vote the State can reasonably expect of a candidate who achieves
ballot status in the general election.""
If a candidate's intent is to wage a legitimate political campaign,
and if he or she represents views held by a reasonable number of
supporters, then whether or not the candidate is a realistic contender
for electoral victory, a position on the ballot is merited. As Justice
Douglas pointed out in Williams v. Rhodes,1°7 "to grant the State
power to keep all political parties off the ballot until they have
enough members to win would stifle the growth of all new parties
working to increase their strength from year to year." Likewise, a
lower federal court was on the right track when it defined "serious
contender"'08 as referring "to the subjective intent of the candidate,
as reflected by objective manifestations and not to the likelihood of
the candidate prevailing in the election."'" Thus, the measure of
support that should be required is lower than serious contention for
electoral victory.
The idea behind drawing the line at inclusion of serious candi-
dates on the ballot is to preserve the respect for and legitimacy of
elections, hence, the stability of the political system; it is not to hold
the number of candidates down to an arbitrary number in order to
avoid voter "confusion." Various ballot access requirements, such as
petitions or filing fees, can be viewed as different mechanisms
designed to draw the necessary line of seriousness. The ballot access
cases of the sixties and seventies evaluated the constitutionality of
these mechanisms, finding some more appropriate than others. A
general trend may be discerned from these cases to broaden ballot
access, although this may be slowing down at present. To determine
which mechanisms for line drawing are acceptable, it is useful to
examine the various state yardsticks for ballot access.
A. Petition Requirements
One mechanism to determine public support for a candidate is
the use of petitions signed by a specified number of registered voters.
Nominating petition requirements for ballot access are used exclu-
106. Id.
107. 393 U.S. 23, 32 (Douglas, J., concurring).
108. Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 746 (1974).
109. Mclnerney v. Wrightson, 421 F. Supp. 726, 731 n.15 (D. Del. 1976).
sively by at least 15 states, and to some extent by 47 states.1 o Gener-
ally, petitions provide an alternative way for minor party or
independent candidates to obtain a place on the ballot when major
party candidates are permitted more automatic access on the basis of
past party performance... or as a winner of party primaries.l12
One initial advantage to using petitioning as a line drawing
technique is that the activity necessitated by going out among the
public to gather signatures may actually foster more robust political
debate." 3 In addition, because petitioning is costly in terms of effort
and money, there is a strong inference that a candidate willing to
attempt the arduous task is indeed serious about his candidacy.
Willingness to sign a nominating petition would seem to be a fair
indication of public support, although there is no perfect measure.
Thus, in the abstract, petitioning seems a reasonable measure of can-
didate seriousness.
Petition requirements, however, do present problems as applied
in practice. This is due basically to the difficulty in setting a required
percentage of voters who must sign a petition in order to entitle the
candidate to ballot access. This is the practical heart of the line
drawing problem. Clearly, a percentage requirement makes more
sense in terms of flexibility under changing circumstances than a flat
numerical requirement. But how can a percentage be determined
that is significant enough so that only serious candidates will attempt
ballot access, but sufficiently practicable so as not to preclude serious
candidacies from a place on the ballot?
There is no easy answer to the question of how a requirement of
a serious candidacy can be translated into a precise percentage of
voter signatures. The Supreme Court held that requiring signatures
of 15 percent of the voters was too high, in the case of Williams v.
Rhodes, 1"4 but held a five percent requirement permissible under the
circumstances presented in Jenness v. Fortson."5 Presumably, an ac-
ceptable maximum falls somewhere in between, but the Court has
provided no ready formula, and the entire configuration of each
state's ballot regulation must be considered in each case. For exam-
ple, a higher percentage requirement might be less offensive if re-
1 10. Comment, The Constitutionality of Qualifying Fees For Political Candidates, 120 U.
PA. L. REV. 109, 113 n.33 (1971) (hereinafter cited as Comment, Fees).
111. See, e.g., statutory mechanism described in Hudler v. Austin, 419 F. Supp. 1002
(E.D. Mich. 1976).
112. See, e.g., Georgia legislation described in Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431 (1971).
Considerations such as fairness, efficiency, cost, and whether other access mechanisms such as
primaries or past performances adequately account for public support and seriousness of can-
didate intent, seem relevant to exclusivity of petition use. These mechanisms also can serve as
acceptable line drawers, primarily affecting major party contenders.
113. See Comment, Fees, supra note 110, at 128-29.
114. 393 U.S. 23 (1968).
115. 403 U.S. 431 (1971). Compare, Illinois Stat. Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers
Party, 99 S. Ct. 983 (1979), wherein the state election code was held unconstitutional insofar as
it required new political parties and independent candidates to obtain more than 25,000 peti-
tion signatures in Chicago, with the result that more signatures were needed for ballot access in
a city election than in a statewide election under a state five percent requirement. 411
quirements as to who may sign a petition were lenient or write-in
candidate status was readily available." 6 The majority opinion in
Williams v. Rhodes" 7 noted that many states have petition require-
ments as low as one percent, and no significant problems have arisen
in these states. Such a requirement seems reasonable; it precludes a
flood of fringe and frivolous candidates by requiring some effort for
ballot access, yet is sufficiently lenient so that ballot access is not an
impossibility for serious candidates. Given that state legislatures are
made up primarily of major party incumbents, who generally
achieve ballot access through mechanisms other than petitioning, it
seems unlikely that these potentially self-interested lawmakers
would set petition requirements for minor candidates at too low a
level.
It has been observed that meeting petition requirements can be
very expensive for a candidate. On the other hand, a primary elec-
tion campaign can be expensive as well for an individual contender.
This cost, however, will not preclude the availability of some major
party candidate in the general election, while a minor party effort
may be entirely undermined by the cost of petitioning. There may
be very real inequity in states in which the administrative costs of
primaries are paid by the state, with no comparable aid to those en-
gaged in the petitioning process.
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Another difficulty in implementing petitioning requirements for
ballot access is the question of the identity of signers of a nominating
petition. Cases such as American Party of Texas v. White 9 and So-
cialists Workers Party v. Rockefeller 2" have upheld state provisions
disallowing signatures on a petition for independent or minor candi-
dates by citizens who voted previously in a major party primary elec-
tion. Alexander Bickel suggested that such regulation discourages
useful coalition formation within the two major parties, which is es-
sential for the stable operation of the political system:' 2'
Voters should be allowed to participate in the nominating process
of only one major party at a time, to be sure, but it is a different
and not easily excusable thing to let potential dissidents partici-
pate in major party nominating proceedings only at the cost of
incurring disqualification as later supporters of a minor candi-
date. '
22
This is a valid criticism, since an individual must either make a
116. See Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431 (1971).
117. 393 U.S. 23, 33 n.9 (1968).
118. See state legislation discussed in American Party of Texas v. white, 415 U.S. 767
(1974).
119. Id.
120. 314 F. Supp. 984 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), a f'd, 400 U.S. 806 (1970), discussed in A. BICKEL,
supra note 14, at 88-89.
121. A. BICKEL, supra note 14, at 89.
122. Id.
break with a major party before the process of compromise can be
attempted, or else give up the right fully to back a minority candi-
date if one is ideologically opposed to the ultimate result of major
party coalition building. Such a choice implicates the impairment of
first amendment rights of free association.
It is possible that a voter could sign a minority candidate's peti-
tion solely in hopes that the minor candidate would draw off votes
from a disfavored major party candidate in the general election, to
the benefit of the favored major party contender-the so-called
stalking horse argument, but signers could also be those ideologi-
cally discontented with the major party candidates. The latter indi-
viduals have a strong first amendment claim. If corrupt motive on
the part of some signers existed, it would be one step removed from
cross over voting in an opposing party primary to help elect a candi-
date easier to defeat in the subsequent general election by one's real
favorite. The petition signer is not voting for the stalking horse, only
helping to get that candidate on the ballot. 23
The response of the Supreme Court to the question of who may
sign a petition has been somewhat ambiguous. In Jenness v. Fort-
son124 the Court seemed in part to uphold Georgia's five percent
signature requirement precisely because primary voters could still
sign nominating petitions. But in American Party of Texas v.
White 125 the Court took a different position, stating,
Electors may vote in only one party primary; and it is not appar-
ent to us why the new or smaller party seeking voter support
should be entitled to get signatures of those who have already
voted in another nominating primary and have already demon-
strated their preference for other candidates for the same office the
petitioning party seeks to fill
26
Surely the issue is not as clear cut as this latter opinion would have
it. Justice Douglas, dissenting in this case, made the valid point that
if primary voters are excluded from the class of potential petition
signers, then independents will be forced to obtain signatures from
the most disinterested voters-those who did not care to vote in a
primary. 27 Paradoxically, in Storer v. Brown, 2 decided at the same
time as American Party, the Court was amenable to considering the
possibility that disqualification of primary voters from signing peti-
tions might mean that from the remaining pool of possible signers, a
candidate would have to obtain considerably more than the five per-
cent signature requirement approved in Jenness in order to satisfy
123. An analogous issue-candidate affiliation requirements--will be discussed subse-
quently.
124. 403 U.S. 431 (1971).
125. 415 U.S. 767 (1974).
126. Id. at 785.
127. Id. at 798-99 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
128. 415 U.S. 724 (1974).
California's requirement of 325,000 signatures-which would be a
dubious result. 29 In summary, the arguments for allowing primary
voters to sign minor or independent candidate petitions appear to
outweigh opposing contentions.
Another difficulty with using petition requirements for ballot
access is that presented by petition filing dates. A state interest in
early filing dates has been asserted, 30 which presumably stems from
a notion that an earlier date will allow more time for the administra-
tive tasks of verifying signatures. When, however, a petition must be
filed before or at the same time as the major party conventions or
primaries, Alexander Bickel again perceived a similar, and equally
undesirable, prevention of coalition building within the two major
parties as that which occurs when primary voters are disqualified
from later signing nominating petitions. Bickel explained this prop-
osition:
(T)he important third-party movements in our history ... came
into being after the two major-party conventions, and were ena-
bled to come into being at that time because major-party conven-
tions used to be held much earlier than at present ....
The characteristic American third party . . . consists of a
group of people who have tried to exert influence within one of
the major parties, have failed, and later decide to work on the
outside. States in which there is an early qualifying date tend to
force such groups to create minor parties without first attempting
to influence the course taken by a major one. For a dissident
group is put to the choice of foregoing.major-party primary and
other prenomination activity or organizing separately early on in
an election year, or losing all opportunity for action as a third
party later.
From the point of view of fostering the two-party system this
is counterproductive. It is calculated to induce early third-party
movements . . . calculated to drive people away from the coali-
tion-building process that is the genius of the two-party system,
and into a premature and more likely permanent ideological sepa-
ratism, which is precisely what the two-party system is intended to
prevent.'
3 1
It is thus suggested that filing deadlines for nominating petitions for
presidential candidates be after major party conventions, 32 or, pre-
sumably, on the state level, after major party primaries or caucuses.
Moving back filing dates may not create as great the administra-
tive problems as supposed. For example, in McCarthy v. Noel 33 a
federal district court allowed Eugene McCarthy ballot access in
129. Contra, Hudler v. Austin, 419 F. Supp. 1002, 1010-11 (E.D. Mich. 1976).
130. See McCarthy v. Kirkpatrick, 420 F. Supp. 366 (W.D. Mo. 1976). Intra-party rule
making also may have an effect on state presidential primary filing deadlines. See Congres-
sional Quarterly Weekly Report 1217 (May 13, 1978).
131. A. BICKEL, supra note 14, at 87-88.
132. Id. at 88.
133. 420 F. Supp. 799, 805 n.10 (D.R.I. 1976).
Rhode Island in 1976, noting that the process of verifying signatures
presented no problem and might not take more than a day or so,' 34
and that McCarthy could easily be entered on the ballot through the
vacant independent column on the voting machines.
To retain early filing dates, in the interest of orderliness seem-
ingly protective of the two-party system, may in fact impair the sta-
bility of the two-party process, and is therefore inadvisable. It is
ironic that states with early filing dates for independent candidates
frequently allow major political parties to nominate substitute candi-
dates as late as a few weeks before the general election when a first
nominee dies, withdraws, or is disqualified after the primary.
35
It would also seem that providing an unreasonably short time
for an independent candidate to gather signatures for the nominating
petition, such that obtaining a sufficient number of signatures be-
comes a practical impossibility or extremely difficult in the time
available, should be held constitutionally infirm.
Despite the practical problems presented by a petition require-
ment, many difficulties can be ironed out, for example, through later
filing dates and permitting primary voters to sign petitions. Because
the relationship between petitioning and candidate seriousness is
strong, nominating petitions may be the most reasonable mechanism
for line drawing to determine whether minor and independent can-
didates are entitled to ballot access. Other mechanisms operate less
effectively.
B. Filing Fees
Filing fees have been utilized in states as a different prerequisite
to ballot access for candidates. Fifteen states employ filing fees for
primary elections.' 36 Under their statutes, a potential candidate
must pay the state a specified amount of money to receive a position
on the ballot.
Filing fee schemes have not fared well in court against chal-
lenges on equal protection grounds. In Bullock v. Carter137 the
Supreme Court held that Texas legislation, providing a filing fee sys-
tem as an absolute prerequisite to candidate participation in a pri-
mary, created an unconstitutional barrier to serious candidates
unable to pay the fee and thus improperly limited the field of candi-
dates from which voters could choose. The Texas scheme provided
no alternatives to the fees for ballot access nor was write-in status
134. But compare R. SMOLKA, ELECTION DAY REGISTRATION, THE MINNESOTA AND
WISCONSIN EXPERIENCE IN 1976 (1977) on the problems of verifying voter registrations.
135. See Washington Post, May 13, 1975, § A, at 9, col. 6.
136. Note, The Constitutionality of Filing Feesfor Political Candidates in Primary Elections."
An Arkansas Analys, 30 ARK. L. REV. 49 (1976).
137. 405 U.S. 134 (1972).
available, and fees ranged as high as $8,900. The law was held to
discriminate in favor of wealthy candidates, and the Court also
found the fees ill-suited to determining candidate seriousness, since
legitimate and frivolous candidates alike were excluded if they could
not afford the fees. Based on the facts of the Texas provision, the
decision seems warranted.
. In Lubin v. Panish138 plaintiff was not permitted to file as a can-
didate under a California law because he was unable to pay the
filing fee, and again, no other alternative mechanism for ballot ac-
cess was available. The Supreme Court held that, absent reasonable
alternative means of ballot access, the state had unconstitutionally
required filing fees of an indigent, and the Court reiterated that fees
did not test the genuiness of a candidacy.
Both cases above addressed filing fees as applied to indigent
plaintiff candidates. Although the Supreme Court has not as yet di-
rectly addressed the legitimacy of filing fees imposed upon non-indi-
gent candidates, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit upheld
fees in this context.139 The court believed that non-indigent candi-
dates were not barred from political expression, because they could
pay the fee and achieve a ballot position, although the fees might
impose a greater hardship on some candidates than on others. Thus,
the constitutionality of filing fees may indeed turn on indigency sta-
tus.
It seemed significant that neither legislative fee scheme ad-
dressed by the Supreme Court provided an alternative route to ballot
access. If an alternative mechanism exists, a decision on the consti-
tutionality of filing fees might change. In 1976 a Texas court deci-
sion found a Texas statute, now requiring candidates in primary
elections to pay filing fees or to submit a petition in lieu thereof, to
be enforceable."4 Therefore, by providing for an alternative to the
fees, a state may save filing fee legislation from invalidation.
Willingness to pay a filing fee could be used as an indication of
candidate seriousness, and the idea is not a new one. Indeed, at one
time in parts of Canada and New Zealand, a candidate had to make
a deposit of money as an indication of his serious intentions, and if
he failed to gain a decent proportion of the vote, the city kept the
money as payment for having been bothered by him. 4 ' While the
forfeiture aspect surely raises first amendment problems, a willing-
138. 415 U.S. 709 (1974).
139. Adams v. Askew, 511 F.2d 700 (5th Cir. 1975), discussed at length in Note, Candidate
Right, supra note 37.
140. See Geiger v. DeBusk, 534 S.W.2d 437 (Civ. App. Tex. 1976); Howell v. DeBusk, No.
21, 207 (Civ. App. Tex., filed Mar. 15, 1976). Cf. American Party of Texas v. White, 415 U.S.
767, 791 n.23 (1974).
141. See R. CILDS supra note 6, at 159-60.
ness to pay a sum of money may be as much evidence of serious
intent as expending effort in gathering signatures. But the use of
filing fees as a test of seriousness fails under several circumstances.
It is possible that a serious candidate will not be able to afford the
fee, especially if it assumes a magnitude of the fees in Texas, and
thus, this candidate will be excluded from the ballot. On the other
hand, frivolous candidates may be able to afford the fee and achieve
undeserved ballot placement. In addition, the filing fee requirement
does not address the second aspect of seriousness-that of a reason-
able amount of public support-at all. Thus, the "fit" of filing fees
as a test of candidate seriousness is not nearly as close as that of
petitioning,' 42 and furthermore, petitioning provides an added bene-
fit in terms of fostering greater political contact between candidate
and voter that a filing fee does not.
Nevertheless, it can be argued with some validity that if a candi-
date cannot afford a reasonably low filing fee, unlike. the outra-
geously high Texas fees, then the candidate may not be able to
generate funds to wage a viable campaign anyway. Yet filing fees do
clearly discriminate against the poor, and it is viability of a candi-
date to place certain minority views before the public, not viability in
terms of winning an election, that is of significance regarding ballot
access.
Filing fees and petitioning requirements, however, may not be
as different as is generally supposed. 43 Petitioning may be just as
costly as filing fees, if not more so, in terms of expenditure of time,
effort, and, probably, money. The real advantage of a petitioning
requirement over that of filing fees is that the "fit" of the former as a
test of candidacy seriousness is much closer. Petioning may not be
any less discriminatory on the basis of wealth or other political re-
sources, such as manpower or time.
Under certain filing fee schemes, the fees collected are used to
support the political parties in the state.'44 Such a provision might
help to preserve the financial soundness of the electoral system, but it
seems an unwarranted discrimination against independent candi-
dates. Although the Supreme Court has sanctioned public funding
of major party presidential candidates to a greater extent than minor
candidates 45 (the FEC may not have resolved the question whether
142. See Comment, Fees, supra note 110, at 114 n.44.
143. But see Duncantell v. Houston, 333 F. Supp. 973 (S.D. Tex. 1971) for a suggestion
that petitioning, unlike filing fees, is not wealth-related.
144. See W. Mansfield, Florida- The Power of Incumbency, in H. ALEXANDER, CAMPAIGN
MONEY, REFORM AND REALITY IN THE STATES 70 (1976); Comment, Fees, supra note 110, at
110. See also Texas legislation at issue in American Party of Texas v. White, 415 U.S. 767,
791-94 (1974).
145. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
independents are entitled to public funds), 14 6 state provisions that
require an independent candidate to pay a fee that is used to help
other political parties he is opposing in the election, seem manifestly
unjustified, especially in light of all the other disadvantages in-
dependents suffer in the elections process.
Yet, in American Party of Texas v. White'47 the Supreme Court
upheld the exclusion of minority parties from the benefits of the
Texas Primary Financing Law of 1972,148 which provided public
funding from state revenues for primary elections of political parties
that received 200,000 or more votes in the preceding gubernatorial
election. Filing fees were used to defray party primary expenses, the
state providing funds to cover any remaining costs. An alternative of
filing a nominating petition was available. The Court noted that
public funding compensated for primary expenses to which the ma-
jor parties alone were subject, and that convention or petitioning op-
tions available for small and new parties did not present the expense
burdening parties that must hold a primary. The Court added that
the state need not fund the efforts of every nascent political group.
This opinion seems to foreshadow the Court's later acceptance of
funding differentials for major and minor parties under the Federal
Election Campaign Act, on the basis that some line drawing is neces-
sary. The Court may not have considered sufficiently, however, that
petitioning, and perhaps conventions, can be proportionately expen-
sive for minor parties, although it is true that the state cannot fund
every fringe group. The problem of line drawing seems pervasive in
the area of public funding of various aspects of the electoral process.
In this case, at least, minor or independent candidates did not have
to pay filing fees used to fund major party primaries, if they used the
petition option instead.
C. Disaffliation Requirements
Another ballot restriction, which particularly focusses on sub-
jective intent behind a potential candidacy, is the disaffiliation re-
quirement. Such state legislation provides that a candidate must
have been dissaffiliated from the political party of which he was pre-
viously a member for a specified period before he can become the
candidate of another party or run as an independent. The trend of
the Supreme Court has been to uphold disaffiliation requirements.
The Court affirmed, without opinion, a requirement as long as four
146. See letter by Ass't Gen'l Counsel, FEC, Nov. 26, 1976, in response to Advisory Opin-
ion Request 1976-81.
147. 415 U.S. 767, 791-94 (1974).
148. McKool-Stroud Primary Financing Law of 1972, TEX. ELEC. CODE art. 13.08c-1, re-
placed by the Primary Conduct and Financing Law of 1974, TEX. ELEC. CODE art. 13.08c-2
(Supp. 1974), as described 415 U.S. at 791, n.23.
years in Lippill v. Cipollone, '49 and upheld a one year California dis-
saffiliation regulation in Storer v. Brown. 50 The opinion in Storer
stated that the function of the primary election was to winnow out
candidates and settle intra-party differences, and that general elec-
tions were not for continuing intra-party feuds. The law was seen as
preventing a primary loser from continuing the struggle.
Preventing a candidate from changing parties too rapidly pre-
serves systemic and party stability by precluding a stalking horse
candidacy.' 5 ' Yet, a stalking horse seems a more unlikely possibility
as the visibility and importance of the office to be filled escalates,
since a newly-adopted party would be loathe to nominate this candi-
date and the stalking horse quality of an independent candidacy
might become very obvious to the public. Reasonably short disaffili-
ation requirements, however, serve a useful purpose. One factor in
setting the length of time could be the frequency of elections for the
office, for example, but surely a candidate should not be allowed to
lose one party primary and then enter another or embark on an in-
dependent candidacy.'52
But too long a disaffiliation regulation may be detrimental to
coalition building within the two major parties. 53 A disaffiliation
requirement such as California's means that a candidate must leave
one party as much as 17 months before a general election, as Justice
Brennan recognized in his Storer dissent. 54 The four year require-
ment in Lippitt is even worse from this standpoint. Instead of en-
couraging the settlement of differences within the party, an overly
long limitation may force the potential candidate to split from one
party prematurely, or otherwise forfeit the right to depart the party
later and run under a more agreeable banner if ideological differ-
ences prove irreconcilable.
From a constitutional perspective, the rights of political expres-
sion and association may be impaired by overly-long disaffiliation
requirements. Justice Douglas, in L7ipitt, aptly pointed out that his-
tory is replete with politicians who changed parties, including Theo-
dore Roosevelt, Strom Thurmond, Wayne Morse, John Lindsay, and
George Wallace, whether disenchanted with previous party activity
or for opportunistic reasons, and that these breaks add vitality to the
149. 404 U.S. 1032 (1972).
150. 415 U.S. 724 (1974).
15 1. Voter affiliation requirements may present issues of party raiding somewhat analo-
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in Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 733, 735 (1974).
153. Compare R. BICKEL, supra note 14, at 87-89.
154. 415 U.S. 724, 758 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
political process.'55
A candidate's interest in getting elected may always be some-
what implicated in a political shift, although generally there is an
element of idology involved as well, and the latter is especially en-
titled to first amendment protection. Thus, one federal district court,
where no state disaffiliation requirement existed, specifically in-
quired into the intent of a former Democrat who was seeking ballot
status as an independent, and found that he legitimately diverged
from his prior party on ideological grounds.'56
D. Residency Requirements
Another type of state statute regulating access to the ballot is
that which sets candidate residency requirements. Reasonable local
and state level residency requirements have generally been upheld in
court. 157 A useful presentation of the issues involved in candidate
residency restrictions is provided in Draper v. Phelps, 8 a three
judge federal court case. At issue was an Oklahoma provision that a
candidate for the state house of representatives must have been a
qualified elector in his district for at least six months before the elec-
tion. The candidate plaintiffs urged the invalidation of comparable
voter residency requirements in Dunn v. Blumstein'59 as analogous.
But the court rejected the closness of the analogy, appropriately
holding that the state's interest in residency requirements for candi-
dates was greater than for voters. It was said that the voter acted for
155. 405 U.S. 1032, 1034 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
156. See Mclnerney v. Wrightson, 421 F. Supp. 726, 731 (D. Del. 1976).
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v. Stark, 353 F. Supp. 1211 (D.N.H.), ar7dmem, 414 U.S. 802 (1973); Gilbert v. State, 526 P.2d
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himself alone, while the state congressman must represent his con-
stituents. If a candidate was not informed about his district through
his residency there, his constituents would suffer. The court added
that the requirement ensured serious candidates who had planned
ahead to run from a particular district, which precluded carpet-bag-
ger candidates, and that the provision gave constituents an opportu-
nity to learn about the candidate as well.
Reasonable candidate residency requirements thus serve a valu-
able, two-way first amendment function of furthering electoral infor-
mation, which is the same function of a political campaign itself. By
residing for a reasonable period in the district to be represented if a
candidate wins the election, the candidate can learn about his con-
stituents, and they may learn more about the candidate.
It has been observed that changes in residency laws and a les-
sening of the political prejudice against "outsiders" have led to a
situation in which candidates look for the best state from which to
run, one factor being the amount of money it might cost to run in
each state.16° Reasonable residency requirements may ensure that
candidates better identify with the constituents they seek to repre-
sent, fostering systemic integrity that might otherwise be undermined
by a phenomenon of candidates shopping for the district in which
their electoral chances will be the greatest, although lacking a real
relationship to that district.
On the other hand, ours is a highly mobile society, and it is
possible that an individual may move into an area, and soon after,
seek office for reasons entirely divorced from a search for an
electible forum. Seriousness and interest in a constituency is not per
se commensurate with length of residency in a district. 6 '
Thus, while candidate residency requirements have a valid
place in electoral regulation because they foster a valuable voter-
candidate informational exchange, the time required should be the
shortest necessary to serve the legitimate state interests involved.
Otherwise, the first amendment rights of candidates, supporters, and
voters may be violated if a serious candidate, interested and in-
formed about the community, is precluded from running by an
overly-long residency requirement. Determining a reasonable time
of residency presents a difficult problem, and factors that might be
160. 2 R. COLE, CAMPAIGN SPENDING IN U.S. SENATE ELECTIONS 92 (Jan., 1975) (unpub-
lished Ph.d. Thesis, Harvard School of Public Policy, on file at Harvard University Library).
161. It has been suggested that the campaign process itself serves an informational func-
tion, that an opponent is likely to point out the fact that a candidate is a relative newcomer to
the district, and that voters can decide if this is important in casting their ballots. Green v.
McKeon, 335 F. Supp. 630, 634 (E.D. Mich. 1971), quoting Mogk v. City of Detroit, 335 F.
Supp. 698 (E.D. Mich. 1971).
considered are the office sought and the characteristics of the electo-
ral district or constituency represented.
E Independent Candidacy
Ballot access for independent candidates presents an interesting
separate issue regarding ballot placement requirements. When some
channel is available for an independent candidate to achieve ballot
access, and the question is whether a less restrictive alternative exists,
courts are more prone to uphold ballot access requirements for in-
dependents, such as nominating petitions. 62 But state legislation
that completely bars ballot access by independent candidates will be
held unconstitutional, as exemplified by the 1976 series of cases suc-
cessfully pursued by independent candidate Eugene McCarthy to
gain ballot access in a number of states.
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A three-part test is emerging for court-ordered ballot access for
an independent candidate: 64 first, is the independent candidate a
serious contender? This addresses the subjective intent aspect of
candidate seriousness discussed previously, but if this requirement
means serious contender for electoral victory, it would seem too
stringent. Second, is the candidate truly independent?165 In other
words, the candidate should not merely be the loser of an intra-party
contest who is seeking a second chance. Third, is there a satisfactory
level of community support for the candidate? 66 Some courts have
been willing to look to national evidence of support when an in-
dependent presidential candidate is concerned, including polls or pe-
tition performance in other states, and have held that petition
signatures are not required in a state that provided no mechanism
for petitioning by an independent candidate.' 67 The third require-
ment is equivalent to the objective component of candidate serious-
ness already mentioned.
It is dubious that a write-in provision standing alone would be
upheld as allowing sufficient ballot access for independent candi-
dates, where no other mechanism for access was provided. 68 The
existence of a write-in provision, however, seemed to lend support to
the Supreme Court in upholding Georgia's five percent petition re-
162. See American Party of Texas v. White, 415 U.S. 767 (1974); cf. Storer v. Brown, 415
U.S. 724 (1974) (remanded to lower court to determine if petition requirement was unduly
burdensome).
163. See Armor & Marcus, The Bloodless Revolution of1976, 63 A.B.A.J. 1108 (1977).
164. See McCarthy v. Tribett, 421 F. Supp. 1193 (D. Del. 1976).
165. See McBride v. Askew, 541 F.2d 465 (5th Cir. 1976); Mclnerney v. Wrightson, 421 F.
Supp. 726, 731 (D. Del. 1976).
166. Id. at 732.
167. McCarthy v. Briscoe, 426 U.S. 1317 (1976); McCarthy v. Askew, 420 F. Supp. 775
(S.D. Fla. 1976). Contra, McCarthy v. Tribbett, 421 F. Supp. 1193 (D. Del. 1976).
168. McCarthy v. Briscoe, 426 U.S. 1317, 1321 (1976) (Powell, J., in chambers).
quirement in Jenness v. Fortson.169 Yet, in Lubin v. Panih,70 the
Court suggested that a write-in procedure would not be an adequate
alternative for an indigent candidate to a filing fee requirement, not-
ing that "the realities of the electoral process . . . strongly suggest
that 'access' via write-in votes falls far short of access in terms of
having the name of the candidate on the ballot."'' 7 It is accurate to
say that the opportunity for write-in status means little in the process
of practical politics, 172 and the write-in option is not a realistic
means of access for a serious independent candidate.
VI. Conclusion
In the ballot access area, recent regulation has been less a ques-
tion of legislative equalization than of judicial liberalization of state
restrictions. Such restrictions may not always reach an acceptable
accommodation between the values of free expression, equality, and
systemic stability, and merit some suspicion as enacted by conceiva-
bly self-interested major party incumbents. Yet, the same constitu-
tional themes have been present in this area as are found in
campaign finance regulation, although in a different balance and ar-
rangement. In the area of campaign finance, free expression and
equality values are in conffict; here they appear on the same side of
the balance.
The real issue in ballot regulation is that of restricting the ballot
to serious candidates only, to protect the integrity of the electoral
process. This is the question, not achieving an arbitrary "shortness"
of the ballot. And, legitimate requirements of seriousness are likely
to result in a ballot of reasonable length anyway.
In its essence, ballot access regulation presents a difficult prob-
lem of line drawing to determine which candidates are sufficiently
serious to merit a place on the ballot. Nominating petitions and can-
didate residency requirements, in particular, may serve as useful
mechanisms to draw the necessary lines.
169. 403 U.S. 431, 434 (1971).
170. 415 U.S. 709 (1974).
171. Id. at 719 n.5. Contra, id. at 722-23 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
172. Comment, Fees, supra, note 110, at 130.

